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CRIMINAL FINES; DO THEY PAY?
ABSTRACT
Since the seminal article by Gary Becker, fines have
been accorded a central role in the theoretical literature
of the economics of crime. Because of the explicit and
implicit policy implications of Becker's and subsequent
analyses it is essential that the superiority of fines as a
criminal sanction be evaluated from an empirical as well as
theoretical perspective. Regardless of the policy rational
for using fines as punishment, the policy objectives are
frustrated if the fine sentences are not or cannot be
enforced. However, the economics literature does not contain
any empirical research on fine enforcement in practice. This
paper fills this void and in this sense it is unique. The
paper develops a methodology for measuring fine enforcement
success by tracking the enforcement success of individual
cases. This methodology is applied to fine cases in fiscal
years 1981-84 from the U.S. District courts for: (i) fines
imposed on persons for drug offenses, (ii) fines imposed on
persons for income tax crimes, and (iii) fines imposed on
corporations for all types of crimes.
The principal findings are that within fiscal year
cohorts fine enforcement success is very low, but
particularly for fines imposed on drug crimes. Even for
fines from $1,000 to $5,000, two years after sentencing only
54% of the amount imposed had been collected. For fines
over $5,000 at most 23% was collected at the end of two
years. Income tax fine enforcement success was better but
for fines from $1,000 to $5,000 it still took eight months
to collect 50% of the amount due. Corporation fine
collection was qu te successful except for the largest fines
— over $50,000.
The paper conjectures that one of the major obstacles to
fine enforcement is the absence of an agency devoted
exclusively to this purpose, analogous to the bureau of
prisons function of enforcing sentences of imprisonment.
Such a fine collection agency exists in Sweden where fines
are extensively used. At present the enforcement
responsibilities are divided among agencies, none of whom
have fine enforcement as their primary responsibility.
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CRIMINAL FINES; DO THEY PAY?
I Introduction
Criminal fines have been accorded a central role in the
theoretical literature of the economics of crime since Gary
Becker's seminal article. Central to Becker's analysis of the
optimal level of crime and punishment was the assumption that
fines had a much lower social cost than imprisonment; hence,
"fines should be used whenever possible". Although Becker's
analysis has been subjected to criticism, it is fair to say that
it remains the most generally accepted framework for the economic
analysis of crime. Further, his presumption as to the inherent
superiority of fines among modes of punishment has remained
essentially unchallenged in the economics of crime literature.
Because of the explicit and implicit policy implications of
Becker's and subsequent analyses it is essential that the
superiority of fines be evaluated from an empirical as well as
theoretical perspective. It is the purpose of this paper to
provide such a perspective. In particular, the focus of this
paper is on criminal fine enforcement success in practice .
Regardless of the rationale for using fines as punishment —
1 [10]
2 For a critiques of some mathematical and conceptual flaws in
Becker's model see [2], [12]. For a general critique of the
economic approach to crime and especially the economists advocacy
of fines see [6]
"minimizing the social costs of crime" — or "doing justice", the
policy objectives are frustrated if fine sentences are not
enforced. To keep the analysis at a manageable and a more
meaningful level, this focus is restricted to criminal fines
imposed on persons for each of two specific crimes — drug
offenses and income tax offenses — and fines imposed on
corporations
.
Drug offenses brings together two conflicting policy
objectives: the budgetary need to avoid further sharply rising
prison populations versus the strong political rhetoric that
promises to win the "war on drugs" through stiffer punishment for
drug offenders. The use of fines is seen as one method of
reconciling this conflict. For example, a very recent policy
innovation introduced in the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988
has added fines as civil penalties for drug offenses. If fines
for drug offenses are as poorly enforced today as the following
analysis shows they were in 1981-84, then it is very hard to see
how fines as civil penalties could be at all effective. The
analysis of this paper suggests that this innovation may be yet
another example of a drug policy that ends up "shooting blanks in
the war on drugs".
3 More accurately the two categories of fined offenders are
natural persons and institutions. Although almost institutions
are corporations, there are a small number of other types of
institutions, e.g. labor unions, local governments, etc.
4 For a current comprehensive review of prison population
problems see [4].
5 For an analysis of drug enforcement policy — successes and
failures see [11]
For the analysis of personal fine enforcement, income tax
offenses provide a valuable contrast to drug offenses. Many drug
offenders would appear to provide a serious problem for fine
enforcement because it is in the interests of persons dealing in
drugs to conceal their income and wealth in order to better avoid
detection. Many income tax offenders, on the other hand have
earned their income and wealth in legitimate activities;
consequently, it should be far easier to find and attach their
property if necessary to enforce a criminal fine. Thus, our
analysis focuses upon the two groups of personal offenders who
present the least and most difficult problem for fine
enforcement. Corporate fines should present the least difficult
problem for fine enforcement because of the greater difficulty
most corporations would face in concealing assets.
The widespread use of fines in the theoretical literature
notwithstanding, the empirical literature on the use of fines is
extremely limited. 6 And within this limited literature, studies
of fine enforcement success are even more rare. Consequently,
this paper is unique in methodology and scope. The analysis is
based upon case level data consisting of a homogeneous set of
offenses all sentenced with the same legal jurisdiction --the
U.S. District Courts. Further, each case is followed up for an
extended period following sentencing, and the fines in these
6 A recent comprehensive study of the use of fines concluded "A
Third common theme is the lack of relevant and reliable
information on fine utilization and enforcement". This study also
provides an extensive bibliography of the fine literature. [9 ;p
.
18]
cases were non-trivial punishments. For the drug offenses the
average fine was $16,870, for the tax offenses the average fine
was $7,151 and for corporate fines the average was $75,706.
(
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Part
II a methodology for measuring fine enforcement success is
developed, in Part III the characteristics of the drug fine
sentences in the data are reviewed; in Part IV the results of
the analysis of drug fine enforcement success are presented, and
finally, Part V contains a summary and concluding remarks.
II A Methodology For Measuring Fine Enforcement Success
In this section we develop a methodology that will support
meaningful generalizations over groups of cases regarding fine
enforcement success. This effort must start with a definition of
"success" for a single case. One approach is to define
enforcement as a single event with a dichotomous outcome —
"success" or "failure" — which takes place at the time of
sentencing. Only full payment at the time of sentencing would be
classified as a "successful" enforcement. If payment was delayed
and/or partial, enforcement would be classified as
"unsuccessful". While this dichotomous/instantaneous approach to
defining enforcement success may seem far too restrictive, this
definition does have the appeal of being well defined and is most (
consistent with the function of fines as punishment.
7 This is reported as the view of the Chairman of the Judicial
Conference Committee on probation; also, the U. S .Attorneys
'
An alternative method is to define a "success index" , as the
percentage of the fine that has been paid at various elapsed
times from sentencing to full payment. However, because it is
obviously not feasible to track partly paid fine cases for long
periods, some ad hoc judgement must be made to limit the time
dimension, e.g., two years. Once a time limit is imposed, the
time dimension of success could be compressed by discounting
payments made after the day of sentencing but before the time
limit using some appropriate discount rate, in effect reducing
all delayed payments to their present value on the day of
sentencing.
This study adopts such a success index for the measurement
of fine enforcement success. Because of data collection costs,
cases are tracked a maximum of two years. No discounting is
done. Rather, the cumulative fine payments are measured at
monthly intervals from sentencing to 24 months. This approach
permits a more detailed analysis of the efficacy of enforcement
process over time. Discounting would compress this time
dependent aspect.
Further, when success is to be measured over groups of
cases, an additional measure of success is possible. The basic
measure of success for the group can be either (i) the
cumulative percent of cases in the cohort, by month since
manual specifies that fines should be paid immediately. [13;p.
38]
sentencing, that have been legally terminated; or (ii) the
cumulative percent of the total dollar amount imposed in the
cohort, by month since sentencing, that has been paid. These two
success indexes can give guite different results depending upon
the mix of fine sizes and offenses in the group of cases to which
they are applied. Because each of these measures, cases
terminated or dollars paid, provides a different but useful
perspective on the enforcement process, both will be employed.
The data are from a data base maintained by the Executive
Office of the U.S. Attorneys for monitoring the collection of
debts owed the U.S. government as a result of court action.
Criminal drug fine cases sentenced in the four fiscal years 1981
through the first six months of fiscal year 1984 comprise the
data upon which the analysis is based. In calendar time, the
data include cases filed during the period October 1, 1980
through March 30, 1984. Since the filing of cases is a
continuous process, fiscal years were used as a basis for
constructing "cohorts" so that a consistent follow-up period
could be established for every case in each cohort. The decision
to limit the follow-up period to two years with monthly
measurements was one of convenience.
Only very limited information on the characteristics of the
offender is available. However, the District Court of origin for (
each case can be identified. 8 Knowledge of the District Court
8 During the period of observation several U.S. Attorney's
offices were using or adopted a new computer system for case
is of value because each District Court has its own U.S.
Attorney. Although each U.S. Attorney follows procedures
established by the Department of Justice, there may still room
for differences in effectiveness in fine enforcement, e.g., due
to differences in the size fine case load.
To measure the cumulative dollars paid, each case in each
cohort is observed at two points in its history. First it is
observed on the day of sentencing; and, second, either (i) when
the case is terminated or (ii) at the end of the follow-up period
for the cohort, or (iii) when the last partial payment is
received. Cases which are terminated during the follow-up period
would fall into (i) , cases for which no payment was received
during the follow-up period would fall into (ii) , cases for which
partial payments were received would fall into (iii) . The
observation following sentencing records the total paid as of the
date of observation and the months since sentencing that the
observation was made. Cohort cases are treated "as if" all of
the cases were sentenced on the same day and all fines in the
cohort are aggregated to form a cohort fine liability. All
cohort payments are cumulated at the end of each month following
sentencing. The ratio of this sum to the cohort fine liability
produces the percent paid as of the end of each month — the
dollars paid enforcement success index.
management. A computer inter-face did not then exist to transfer
fine data into the central collections data base. Consequently,
no cases from these districts are in the data used.
8If case termination is the basic measure of success, each
case is still observed at only two points: at sentencing and at
the date of termination or the end of the follow-up period,
whichever occurs first. The number of cases terminated in each
cohort are cumulated at the end of each month following
sentencing. The ratio of this total to the total cases in the
cohort gives the terminated cases enforcement success index.
We are interested both in describing and analyzing the fine
collection process over the life of similar cases; we assume
that all cases filed within the same fiscal year are
representative of this process for that year. If any significant
change in the fine collection process was introduced within the
fiscal year, then this assumption would not be defensible. For
example, if legislation changing the enforcement powers for fine
collection became effective within a fiscal year, then the
process would differ for cases filed before the legislation from
those filed after. There is no evidence that such an abrupt
change occurred during the period of the data. However, if the
fine collection process was consistently improving or degrading
over the total observation period, then a comparison of the fine
collection success results between fiscal years could reveal such
a trend if the trend were sufficiently pronounced.
The decision to limit the follow up period for cases to 24 (
months was based both on the limited overall period available —
four years — and an assumption that in most cases all payments
on the fine would take place within 24 months of the sentence.
That is, if the fine was not paid in full by the end of 24
months, this would imply a very low level of collection
"success". The exceptions would be if payment of the fine were a
condition of probation and the period of probation exceeded 24
months, or if the fine was imposed along with imprisonment of
over two years. However, it was not possible to identify cases
where a fine sentence combined with probation or imprisonment.
The 24-month follow-up period could not be implemented for
all cases in every fiscal year. All F/Y 83 cases could only be
followed up for 12 months. For F/Y 1984 cases there could be no
uniform follow-up period if all F/Y 84 cases were used as a
cohort. Consequently, to preserve some information from 1984
cases, the cohort was limited to only the cases filed during the
first six months of fiscal year 1984 thus permitting a six follow
up period for this cohort. Some cases from each fiscal year —
those files towards the end of the year — could have been
tracked for longer than the follow-up period used; however, to do
so would have introduced a serious inconsistency among cases
within cohorts. The follow-up period for all cases in each year
(cohort) is summarized below.
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Fiscal Year
( cohort ) Filing Period :
End of Length of
Follow-up Period : Follow-up Period :
1981 10/01/80- 9/30/81
1982 10/01/81- 9/30/82
1983 10/01/82- 9/30/83
1984 10/01/83- 3/31/84
9/30/83
9/30/84
9/30/84
9/30/84
2 4 months
2 4 months
12 months
6 months
III Characteristic of Fine Sentences:
The database did not contain any information specifically on
the seriousness of the offense, e.g., misdemeanor or felony.
However, the size of the fine may be used as a good proxy for the
seriousness of the offense. In Table 1 the distribution of the
drug cases are reported by eight fine size categories. Fines in
the low ranges — below $1000 — comprise only 14% of the cases.
Fines in the mid-ranges, $1,000 to $25,000, accounted for the
great majority of the sentences (69%) , and only 17% were greater
than $25,000. Only 5% fell in the highest range, over $100,000.
We conclude that over 80% of the sentences in the sample were
imposed on serious offenses.
In Table 2 characteristics of the drug fine sentences are
reported for cases filed in each of the fiscal year cohorts.
There are no marked time trends revealed in the data except the
number of drug fines increased each year. It is important to
11
note that the size of the maximum fine imposed differs markedly
from year to year. This has a significant effect on the total
dollar value of fines imposed in each year and consequently on
the cohort "fine base" used to compute fine enforcement success.
Similar data for income tax cases is given in Table 5. The number
of income tax cases receiving a fine fell over the four year
period, but the average size fine increased.
The size distribution of the income tax fines by size are
given in Table 4. In these cases the fine sentences were even
more concentrated in the mid-range — above $1,000 and below
$25,000. Only 12% percent of the income tax fines fell outside
of this range. While Table 7 shows that most corporate fines also
fell in the mid-range there were fewer small fines and more of
the largest fines.
Table 8 shows that the average corporate fine, unlike the
personal fines, more than doubled over the observation period.
Also the size distribution of corporate fines is shifted upwards.
Table 7 shows that only 12% of corporate fines were less than
$1,000 but 23% were over $50,000. The mid-size range, above
$1,000 and below $25,000 accounted for 58% of all corporate
fines
.
In order to investigate whether there was a scale factor
influencing the fine enforcement process, districts were
classified into two groups using total (not just drug fines) fine
12
Q
case load: "Large" and "Small" . If a district's fine case load
exceeded that of the average district for at least three of the
four years, it was classified as having a "Large" case load and
its case were so identified. All other districts and their cases
were placed in the "Small" case load category. Of the
approximately 90 district courts represented in the sample,
sixteen were in the Large category. However, as Table 1
indicates, the "Large" category districts accounted for
approximately half of the drug cases. The distribution of cases
between the two size categories within each fine size category is
also approximately evenly divided. The distribution of the
income tax cases in Table 4 indicates that the "Large" districts
accounted for only about a third of the cases.
IV Enforcement Success
Drug Fines : In order to analyze the effect of fine size on
enforcement success, both the cumulative percent of cohort fines
paid and the cumulative percent of cases terminated were computed
for each of eight size categories. The principal findings of the
analysis for drug fines are presented in Table 3 and Figure 1.
For drug fines, it is clear that collection success was far
from complete even in the smallest size category, $100 to $500.
9 The total database of fine cases for the four years includes
over 16,000 cases. Consequently, there should be a large enough
number of cases in most districts for a scale effect to be
revealed, if one existed.
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Only fifty percent of the value of the cohort's fines were
collected at the sixth month following sentencing. At the end of
two years this percentage had reached 92%. Fines of $500 to
$1000 were did not reach the 50% level of payment until the
twelfth month. At the end of two years the level of payment
reached 79%. In the third category, $1,000 to $5,000, 50% of the
fines were not collected until the 22nd month. Fines in the
higher categories only reached 2 3% paid at the end of the two-
year follow up period. Fines higher than $50,000 were 95% unpaid
at the end of the follow up period.
It will appear strange that the cumulative percent paid of
the two largest fine categories was not monotonic. The
cumulative percent paid for both categories fall slightly after
the twelfth month. The reason for this is that at the end of the
twelfth month the 1983 cohort drops out of the total sample. The
percent paid within this cohort was higher than the 1983 and 1984
cohorts in the twelfth month; consequently, when these cases were
removed the average percent for the remaining cases fell. A
similar reduction in the number of cases also occurred at the end
of the sixth month when the 1984 cohort was removed. However,
the monotonic nature of the overall percent paid was not
affected.
The enforcement success for each of the fiscal year cohorts,
computed over all sizes of fines, is shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 uses the percent paid index and Figure 3 uses the
14
percent of cases terminated index. As was suggested above, these
two indexes give quite different results because the case mix in
each cohort is quite heterogeneous with respect to fine size. In
contrast, in Table 3 the two indexes give very similar results
because the size of fines within each fine category, although not
identical, are very similar.
The enforcement success over all fines is of very limited
interest not only because of the variety of success rates by fine
size categories that are concealed, but also because the extremes
of drug fines sizes are of limited importance for policy. The
smallest fines are either used for minor offenses, or if used for
serious drug offenses would lack any deterrent or punishment
effect. Fines in the largest categories, over $25,000, are both
relatively rare and during the sample period, had almost no
enforcement success.
For these reasons the aggregate fine enforcement success for
mid-range drug fines — $1,000 to $25,000 — is presented in
Figure 4. This indicates very similar enforcement success over
the four cohorts. The two later years show slightly better
success, but their shorter enforcement period limits the
significance that can be attached to this result.
Income Tax Fines : The enforcement success for income tax fines
is reported in Table 6 and Figures 6 and Figure 7. These data
indicate that enforcement success was significantly better than
15
drug fines. In the lowest size category — $100 to $500 —over
50% of all the tax fines were paid before the end of the first
month; this level of payment of drug fines in this category was
not attained until during the sixth month following sentencing.
The results for the three categories comprising what we have
defined as the mid-size range — $1,000 to $25,000 — are quite
similar. Surprisingly, the lowest size category in this range did
not reach the 50% payment level until the eighth month, but the
two higher categories both attained this level during the fifth
month. The results for fines over $2 5,000 are very erratic
because of the small numbers of cases and their large size. Only
the $25,000 to $50,000 category is presented in Figure 6. The
amount collected from this category never reached 50% during the
two year follow-up period.
The enforcement success for each fiscal year cohort is
given in Figure 7. The years 1981 to 1983 show very similar
results; however, in 1984 over the first six months the success
was markedly lower. This decline cannot be attributed to an
upward shift in fine sizes because 1984 cases had the lowest
average size fine for any of the four years.
Corporate Fines: The enforcement success of the corporate fines
by size of fine using percent of fines paid is given in Table 9
and Figure 9. Not surprisingly, the enforcement success is
markedly better than for either personal drug or income tax
fines. The analyses of corporate fine enforcement success was
16
based on an aggregation of fines over all types of offenses.
There were too many cases with the offense type missing to make
the analyses offense specific. All fines in the size categories
below $10,000 reached the 50% paid or higher level within the
first month following sentencing. In the two highest categories
of fines the 50% paid level was reached in 12 and 14 months
respectively. Although corporate fine enforcement is clearly
superior to personal fine enforcement, there is still substantial
room for improvement in all but the $100 to $500 category. For
example, in the two largest size categories the percent of
dollars paid only 75% at the end of two years after sentencing.
None of this delay can be attributed to imprisonment or
probation.
Enforcement success measured by dollars paid and cases
terminated for each fiscal year cohort are reported in Figures 10
to 12 . The disparate results between the fiscal year cohorts in
Figures 10 and 11 are attributable both to a few very large fines
in 1983 and 1984 and the fact that these were paid in full.
Because the dollars-paid measure weights the fines by their size,
the years 1983 and 1984 show markedly higher enforcement success
in Figure 10 but slightly lower enforcement success in Figure 11
where the measure of success is percent of cases terminated.
Figure 12 omits fines below $1,000, but because the smallest
corporate fines have very little weight in the cohorts, Figure 12 (
is only marginally different from Figure 10 where all fines are
included.
17
Scale Factor ; Another possible determinant of enforcement
success, in addition to fine size, is the existence of a scale
factor in the enforcement process. As noted above, drug, tax
and corporate fine cases were classified into two groups
according to whether the fine sentence was imposed in a district
court with a larger than average fine case load or a district
with a smaller than average fine case load. Because case load
was measured using all fine cases, the district courts in each
size class is the same for each of the three groups of fines.
The enforcement success index for the personal drug and
income tax fines by district case load are reported in Figures 5
and 8. In Figures 5 and 8 only personal fines in the mid-size
ranges are used. For drug fines the courts with the smaller fine
case load have markedly better enforcement success after twelve
months have elapsed than districts with large case loads. With
tax fines, the small case load courts also have better
enforcement success, but over the of the follow-up period. We
cannot conclude, however, that this result is necessarily a
diseconomy of scale because we have no information on the level
of inputs into the enforcement process in the two groups of
districts. It could simply indicate that enforcement resources
were not allocated within districts in proportion to case loads.
If the districts with large case loads have fewer enforcement
resources per case, it is not surprising that their "enforcement
output" is lower.
18
The corporate fine enforcement results by district case load
are reported in Figure 13. There is no significant difference in
enforcement success between districts with large caseloads and
those with small case loads. This result need not be
inconsistent with the evidence that the scale factor is a
determinant of personal fine collection success. Both a priori
reasoning and the data indicate that fine enforcement is more
difficult for personal fines than for corporate fines;
consequently , staffing problems related to caseload may impact on
personal fine collection but not on corporate fine collection. 10
V Summary and Conclusions
The most salient finding of the analysis is the low
enforcement success achieved for all but the smallest fines, but
particularly for drug fines larger than $1,000. We conclude with
some possible explanations for this enforcement failure.
Any analysis of fine enforcement failure must start with the
sentencing role of the courts. Judging from the size of the
largest drug fines and the almost total failure of enforcement,
it is difficult to believe that the judge would not have known
that these fines were uncollectible when they were imposed. If
this were the case, the sentence would seem at best to be (
10 A field study of seven U.S. Attorney's offices by the General
Accounting Office reported that criminal fine collections suffer
from staffing problems [13; p. 35]
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capricious and, in effect, to trivialize both the sentencing
function of the court and the fine as a sanction. One of the
unexpected benefits of federal sentencing guidelines may be to
discourage fine sentences which are so large as to
uncollectible.
The uncoordinated responsibility for fine enforcement
within the U.S. criminal justice system agencies must also be
considered as part of the explanation. This point is best made
by a comparison of fines with imprisonment. In the federal
government and each state a specialized agency exists to enforce
sentences to imprisonment — the prison system. The other
agencies have similarly focused responsibilities; the prosecutor
has responsibility for prosecuting individuals accused of
violating the criminal laws. Both training and professional
recognition dictate that prosecutors focus on obtaining
convictions . The primary responsibility of the courts is to
determine guilt or innocence and to render a sentence, upon a
finding of guilty. If the sentence is to imprisonment, the
responsibility for enforcement quickly passes to the prison
system, another specialized agency with this as its primary
responsibility.
In this organizational structure, the responsibility for
enforcing a fine sentence has no natural organizational home.
11 Both the Sentencing Commission Guidelines and criminal
statutes explicitly mandate that judges consider the financial
ability of the defendant to pay the fine. [19;p.5.15], [16; p.
18] .
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Most legal scholars would agree that fine enforcement is the duty
of the executive branch — the prosecutor — however, obtaining
convictions is still their primary duty and the basis upon which
their professional reputation rests. By default, enforcement has
frequently fallen to probation officers — officers of the court
— when the fine is a condition of probation. This
responsibility appears to be in conflict with the professional
training and orientation of probation officers which emphasizes
rehabilitation of probationers as their goal.
Probation officers have the power and responsibility to
control the milieu of the probationer to minimize the risk of
future criminal activity, e.g., holding a steady job, not
associating with individuals of questionable character, etc. The
function of these constraints imposed on probationers may be
interpreted as either punishment — restricted personal freedom -
- or rehabilitation. If the training and professional image held
by probation officers is associated primarily with the goal of
rehabilitation, then simultaneously having to enforce a fine
would seem to be a conflicting responsibility. In this situation
it would not be surprising if fine enforcement were given a low
priority. 12
12 General Accounting Office investigators report, based upon
interviews in probation offices in five district courts that
"Most probation officers interviewed view 'bill collection' as
contradictory to their rehabilitative duty and seldom recommend
revocation because fines have not been paid.". In a sample of
478 delinquent fine cases that in only 8% of these cases was
probation extended or revoked. [13; p. 35-36]
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Conclusions : Concern about criminal fine enforcement at the
policy level has produced new legislation to correct some of the
most serious administrative deficiencies in fine enforcement
process. 13 Our analysis amply documents the failure of the
process in the period immediately preceding the first legislative
response. However, there is as yet no evidence that the 'reform'
of the system has had its desired effect. At an a priori level,
there is reason to question the efficacy of these changes as they
have left the basic administrative structure in place without any
fundamental reordering of conflicting priorities of the principal
agents in the process — judges, prosecutors, and probation
officers. Further, even if these reform efforts are shown to be
effective, it will still need to be shown that they are cost
effective.
Given the real possibility that these efforts may not be
cost effective, it is important to experiment with more
fundamental reforms, reforms that can demonstrate social cost
savings that have been accorded, too glibly it would seem, to the
use of fines over imprisonment. Such reforms could include the
use of day fines as in Sweden. This type of fine requires the
court to more carefully balance an offender's ability to pay
with the appropriate level of punishment. Another reform,
again drawing upon the experience of Sweden, would be to create
an independent agency with the sole responsibility of collecting
13 For detailed account of this legislative oversight process
and the resulting legislation see [ 13 ] , [ 14 ] , [ 15] , [17] and [18].
14 Day fines have also been adopted by the German judicial
system. [8]
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debts owed the government, including fines. This would
parallel the role of the Bureau of Prisons as the agency
dedicated to enforcing sentences of imprisonment.
We end by returning to the title of the paper — Criminal
Fines, Do They Pay? — which poses two questions. The first is
"Do offenders pay their fines?" The second is "Do the use of
fines pay for society as a criminal sanction in terms of low
social costs of punishment?" As the paper has established that
the answer to the first question is certainly not an unqualified
"Yes", then the answer to the second one cannot be an unqualified
"Yes" as economists have too often assumed based only on a priori
arguments. The answer to the second and most important question
must wait until we know the enforcement costs necessary to
produce an "Yes" answer to the first question.
15 [7;p. 202]
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>TABLE 1
Distribution of Drug Fine Sentences By Size of Fine
Cases by-
District With
Fiscal Year: 1981-84 Fine Case Load
Size Category 1981 1982 1983 1984* Number Percent Large Small
$ 100 - $ 499
$ 500 - $ 999
$ 1,000 - $ 4,999
$ 5,000 - $ 9,999
$ 10,000 - $24,999
$ 25,000 - $49,999
$ 50,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - Up
All Size Categories
17 15 25 20 77 6% 36 41
31 19 24 31 105 8% 61 44
64 65 126 126 381 29% 211 170
48 39 77 53 217 17% 120 97
74 82 88 55 299 23% 141 158
21 29 32 19 101 8% 51 50
8 15 22 12 57 4% 28 29
6 25 25 7 63 5% 33 30
69 289 419 323 1300 100% 681 619
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 2
Drug Fine Sentences Characteristics By Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year:
Characteristic 1981 1982 1983 1984* 1981-84
Minimum Fine $100 $100 $100 $100 $100
Maximum Fine $530,000 $220,000 $1,035,000 $170,000 $1,035,000
Average Fine $14,028 $21,880 $20,470 $10,084 $16,870
Fine Sentences 269 289 419 323 1,300
Total Fines $3,773,563 $6,323,350 $8,577,105 $3,257,072 $21,931,090
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 3
Drug Fine Enforcement Success
By Fine Size and By Elapsed Months Following Sentencing
Cumulative % of Dollars Paid:
Fine Size Category:
Cumulative % of Cases Terminated1
Fine Size Category:
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 23 5 7 5 2 24 3 6 5 2
2 25 7 10 7 4 28 6 9 7 4
3 37 10 12 8 5 42 9 11 9 6
4 38 19 13 11 7 42 18 11 11 7
5 43 22 14 12 7 48 20 13 12 7
6 59 28 16 13 9 1 59 27 14 13 9
7 69 30 20 15 9 2 70 31 18 15 8 2
8 69 32 21 16 9 4 2 71 32 20 16 9 3 3
9 74 37 22 16 10 4 2 73 36 20 16 9 3 3
10 75 41 22 16 10 4 2 75 40 21 16 9 3 2 3
11 75 48 25 17 10 6 2 2 75 45 23 16 10 6 2 3
12 75 52 28 17 11 6 4 2 77 50 26 17 11 6 4 3
13 79 60 32 19 12 5 3 5 78 60 31 19 12 6 4 6
14 79 60 34 19 12 5 3 5 78 60 34 19 12 6 4 6
15 79 64 35 20 14 5 3 5 78 64 35 20 14 6 4 6
16 79 64 38 22 14 7 4 5 78 64 38 21 14 8 4 6
17 79 64 39 22 15 12 4 5 78 64 40 21 16 12 4 6
18 79 69 41 22 19 12 4 5 78 70 41 21 19 12 4 6
19 79 71 42 22 19 12 4 5 78 72 41 21 19 12 4 6
20 79 71 42 22 20 12 4 5 78 72 41 21 20 12 4 6
21 90 73 47 22 21 12 4 5 87 74 47 21 21 12 4 6
22 90 73 50 22 21 14 4 5 87 74 50 21 21 14 4 6
23 90 77 52 22 23 14 4 5 90 78 51 21 23 14 4 6
24 92 79 54 23 23 16 4 5 93 80 53 21 24 16 4 6
Fine
Category
1
• Size of Fines:
$ 100 - $ 499
2 $ 500 - $ 999
3 $ 1, 000 - $ 4 ,999
4 $ 5, 000 - $ 9 ,999
5 $ 10, 000 - $24 ,999
6 $ 25, 000 - $49 ,999
7 $ 50, 000 - $99 ,999
8 $100, 000 - 1Jp
[FFTLB3.DOC]
TABLE 4
Distribution of Income Tax Fine Cases By Size of Fine
Cases by
District With
Fiscal Year: 1981-84 Fine Case Load
Size Category 1981 1982 1983 1984* Number Percent Large Small
1) $ 100 - $ 499 12
2) $ 500 - $ 999 39
3) $ 1,000 - $ 4,999 144
4) $ 5,000 - $ 9,999 123
5) $ 10,000 - $24,999 85
6) $ 25,000 - $49,999 11
7) $ 50,000 - $99,999 3
8) $100,000 - Up 1
6 1 1 20 2% 4 16
12 9 3 63 6% 14 49
98 88 35 365 34% 131 234
94 77 30 324 30% 113 211
74 78 38 275 25% 115 160
7 8 5 31 3% 11 20
1 2 1 7 1% 6 1
2 3 0% 3
92 265 113 1088 100% 397 691
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 5
Income Tax Fine Size Characteristics By Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year:
Characteristic 1981 1982 1983 1984* 1981-84
Minimum Fine $100 $100 $250 $200 $100
Maximum Fine $100,000 $60,000 $250,000 $70,000 $250,000
Average Fine $6,239 $6,523 $8,916 $8,009 $7,151
Fine Sentences 418 292 265 113 1088
Total Fines $2,608,053 $1,904,602 $2,362,708 $905,017 $7,780,380
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 6
Income Tax Fine Enforcement Success
By Fine Category and Elapsed Months Following Sentencing
\
Cumulative % of Dollars Paid:
Fine Size Category:
Cumulative % of Cases Terminated:
Fine Size Category:
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 54 33 25 29 25 23 55 33 27 29 26 25
2 54 36 31 37 37 23 12 55 36 33 37 40 25 14
3 58 42 35 43 43 26 12 60 42 36 43 45 29 14
4 67 45 37 47 47 39 40 1 70 46 38 47 49 41 42 33
5 72 50 39 50 50 44 40 1 75 50 41 50 52 48 42 33
6 72 56 42 53 53 44 40 1 75 57 44 53 54 48 42 33
7 75 59 48 55 57 42 66 1 78 60 50 55 59 46 66 33
8 81 64 50 56 57 42 66 39 84 65 52 56 60 46 66 66
9 81 69 53 57 58 42 66 61 84 70 54 57 61 46 66 66
10 81 69 54 59 61 42 66 61 84 70 56 58 63 46 66 66
11 81 73 57 60 62 42 66 61 84 73 58 59 64 46 66 66
12 81 76 59 63 64 47 66 61 84 76 60 61 67 50 66 66
13 86 72 66 70 66 36 50 10 88 72 67 69 70 38 50 100
14 92 72 69 71 67 47 50 10 94 72 68 70 71 50 50 100
15 92 72 69 71 67 47 50 10 94 72 69 70 71 50 50 100
16 92 74 70 74 68 47 50 10 94 74 71 73 72 so- 50 100
17 100 76 71 77 72 47 50 10 100 76 71 75 76 so 50 100
18 100 76 72 77 72 47 50 10 100 76 73 75 76 50 50 100
19 100 78 74 79 72 47 72 10 100 78 75 77 76 50 75 100
20 100 78 76 80 73 47 72 10 100 78 76 78 77 50 75 100
21 100 78 78 80 73 47 72 10 100 78 77 79 77 50 75 100
22 100 79 78 81 74 47 72 10 100 80 77 79 77 50 75 100
23 100 79 79 81 75 47 72 10 100 80 78 79 78 50 75 100
24 100 81 80 82 75 47 72 10 100 82 79 80 79 50 75 100
Fine
Category
1
• Size of Fines:
$ 100 - $ 499
2 $ 500 - $ 999
3 $ 1, 000 - $ 4 ,999
1
4 $ 5, 000 - $ 9 ,999
1
5 $ 10, 000 - $24 ,999 1
6 $ 25, 000 - $49 ,999 ^
7 $ 50, 000 - $99 ,999
8 $100, 000 1Jp
TABLE 7
Distribution of Corporate Fine Cases By Size of Fine
Cases by
District With
Fiscal Year: 1981-84 Fine Case Load
Size Category 1981 1982 1983 1984* Number Percent Large Small
1)« $ 100 - $ 499 10 10 3 2 25 4% 3 22
2) $ 500 - $ 999 22 18 5 2 47 8% 4 43
3) $ 1,000 - $ 4,999 74 54 28 13 169 27% 47 122
4) $ 5,000 - $ 9,999 40 12 17 5 74 12% 26 48
116 19%
43 7%
41 6%
108 17%
623 100%
5) $ 10,000 - $24,999 50 24 25 17 49 67
6) $ 25,000 - $49,999 14 9 11 9 18 25
7) $ 50,000 - $99,999 7 11 18 5 22 19
8) $100,000 - Up 28 44 24 12 53 55
All Size Categories 245 182 131 65 222 401
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 8
Corporate Fine Size Characteristics By Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year:
Characteristic 1981 1982 1983 1984* 1981-84
Minimum Fine $100 $100 $150 $200 $100
Maximum Fine $1,290,000 $2,000,070 $3,150,000 $2,750,000 $3,150,000
Average Fine $43,331 $88,631 $103,857 104,810 $75,706
I Fine Sentences 245 182 131 65 623
Total Fines $10,616,045 $16,130,800 $13,605,211 $6,812,650 $47,164,706
* 1984 includes only first six months
TABLE 9
Corporate Fine Enforcement Success
By Fine Category and Elapsed Months Following Sentencing
Cumulative % of Dollars Paid:
Fine Size Category:
Month
Cumulative % of Cases Terminated: %
Fine Size Category:
8
1 96 66 66 54 45 34 19 19 88 70 63 56 44 32 19 13
2 96 79 78 61 57 43 24 33 92 82 76 65 57 44 24 27
3 96 81 82 66 59 52 31 35 92 85 81 69 60 53 29 29
4 98 81 83 66 63 53 35 43 96 85 83 69 63 53 31 36
5 98 84 83 67 65 54 37 45 96 87 84 72 66 53 34 39
6 98 87 84 67 69 61 39 46 96 89 85 72 69 60 36 41
7 98 87 84 71 71 64 42 40 95 88 85 75 73 64 38 44
8 98 87 84 72 71 64 45 42 95 88 85 77 73 64 41 46
9 98 89 86 72 73 64 45 42 95 88 87 77 74 64 41 46
10 98 89 88 72 74 64 49 44 95 88 87 77 75 64 44 47
11 98 89 88 72 75 69 49 44 95 88 88 77 76 70 44 47
12 98 89 90 74 78 69 52 49 95 88 89 78 79 70 47 54
13 100 90 94 80 85 77 68 47 100 92 93 84 86 82 66 56
14 100 93 95 80 86 77 68 50 100 95 94 84 87 82 66 59
15 100 93 95 84 86 77 68 61 100 95 94 88 87 82 66 62
16 100 93 95 84 87 77 68 61 100 95 94 88 87 82 66 62
17 100 93 95 84 88 77 74 61 100 95 94 88 89 82 72 62
18 100 93 96 84 89 77 74 66 100 95 95 88 90 82 72 68
19 100 93 96 84 89 77 74 66 100 95 95 88 90 82 72 68
20 100 95 96 84 89 77 74 66 100 97 95 88 90 82 72 68
21 100 97 96 84 89 82 74 69 100 100 95 88 90 86 72 70
22 100 97 96 84 89 82 74 71 100 100 96 88 90 86 72 70
23 100 97 96 84 89 82 74 73 100 100 96 88 90 86 72 72
24 100 97 96 84 90 82 74 78 100 100 96 88 91 86 72 77
Fine
Category:
1
Size of Fines:
$ 100 - $ 499
2 $ 500 - $ 999
3 $ 1 ,000 - $ 4,999
4 $ 5 ,000 - $ 9,999
5 $ 10 ,000 - $24,999
6 $ 25 ,000 - $49,999
7 $ 50 ,000 - $99,999 1
8 $100 ,000 - Up
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FIGURE 2 Drug Fine Enforcement Success: All Sizes of Fines
[ By FY Cohort ]
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FIGURE 3 — Drug Fine Enforcement Success: All Sizes of Fines
[ Terminated Cases By FY Cohort ]
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FIGURE 4 Drug Fines $l,000-$25,000 Enforcement Success
[ By FY Cohort ]
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FIGURE 5 - Drug Fine $1 ,000-$25,000 Enforcement Success
By District's Fine Case Loac
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FIGURE 7 Tax Fine $1 ,000-$25,000 Enforcement Success
[ By FY Cohort ]
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FIGURE 8 Tax Fine $l,000-$25,000 Enforcement Success
[ By District's Fine Case Load ]
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FIGURE 10 - Corporate Fine Enforcement Success: All Fines,
Percent of Dollars Paid By FY Cohort
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FIGURE 1 1 - Corporate Fine Enforcement Success: All Fines
Percent of Cases Terminated By FY Cohort
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FIGURE 12 - Corporate Fine Enforcement Success: Fines $1,000
and Higher, Percent of Fines Paid By Fiscal Year Cohort
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FIGURE 13 - Corporate Fine Enforcement Success Fines $1,000
and Higher By Case Load of District, All FY Cohorts Combined
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